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The author came to the US in 1960 and ate his first McDonald’s hamburger in Madison, Wisconsin, in 1961, at a time when the signs said, “Over 125 million served.” He has happily eaten at
McDonald’s several times a year ever since, but unfortunately never bought its shares. He has not
consulted for McDonald’s or any other fast food company, and does not expect to in the future,
though he would not be averse to doing so, having recently renovated the kitchen in his house.
The author would also like to thank participants at seminars at Victoria University of Wellington
and the University of Melbourne for their comments and criticisms of an earlier draft. (What
motivated the disclaimer above was the response of a participant at one of these seminars, whose
questions implied that only venality could explain the author’s suggesting that McDonald’s might
not represent unalloyed evil, the participant having presumably ruled out an alternative hypothesis of stupidity.) This paper draws in part on information gathered for the case study, “The sun
never sets on the Golden Arches”: McDonald’s internationalizes’ that the author and his colleague
Mauro Guillén prepared for classroom use at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Lastly, the author would like to thank the anonymous referee for encouraging him to write
more forcefully.
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1.0 Introduction
“Mal bouffe”; junk food; seducer of children; employer of burger-flippers;
exploiter of low-skilled labor; symbol of cultural imperialism; symbol of
corporate greed; symbol of America. McDonald’s is a target of criticism aimed at
its products and itself (Schlosser 2002), and even suffers collateral damage from
criticism targeted at its country of origin (Faulk and Usunier 2004). For those
interested in the company’s reaction, Greenberg and Naim (2001) is the report of
an interview in which Naim lays out the common charges to which Greenberg, the
then CEO of McDonald’s, responds. Despite the charges, Interbrands estimated
that in 2006, McDonald’s was the eighth most valuable brand name in the world,
with a market value of US$29.4bn.
What is interesting about the accusations of illegitimacy (unlike claims of
liability in accidents or situations of product liability) is that the accusations
typically involve a diffuse set of victims, victims who are indirect in that they are
neither the accusers themselves nor even frequently direct consumers.1 The
accusations are difficult clearly to prove or disprove, and reside in the ethical or
moral domain rather than in the legal domain. Kostova and Zaheer (1999) have a
conceptual paper that extends the discussion of organizational legitimacy to the
multinational company.
This paper does not seek to make a balanced assessment of the charges
and counter-arguments to them; instead, the paper simply argues that the presence
in a country of fast-food chains in general, and McDonald’s in particular, is also a
source of benefits. The effect of McDonald’s entry has been to introduce some
positive changes in its host countries and one may therefore consider McDonald’s
an agent of economic development. More specifically, McDonald’s provides
management training, encourages entrepreneurship, creates backward linkages
that develop the capabilities of suppliers, promotes exports, and generates positive
externalities in the form of productivity levels and service standards in the
countries in which it operates.
The existing literature on productivity spillovers from FDI (e.g. Kokko
1994 and Kokko et al., 1996) has focused on the manufacturing sector and
highlighted issues concerning technology such as gaps, host-country absorptive
capacity, and the like as sources of impediments to productivity spillovers. A
recent review of the literature (Meyer and Sinani 2006) points out the
indeterminacy in results from attempts to estimate spill-over effects. What is
interesting about the fast-food industry is that is in the service sector, and that the
level of technological sophistication in the production process is not high.
(Supply-chain management may be another issue.) Thus the fast-food industry is
one in which one might reasonably expect productivity spillovers.
1

I owe this paragraph in its entirety to Srilata Zaheer.
1
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The approach of the paper is consistent with the veterinary pathologist
W.I.B. Beveridge’s (1961; 140) argument that:
“More discoveries have arisen from intense observation of very
limited material than from statistics applied to large groups. The value
of the latter arises mainly in testing hypotheses derived from the
former.”
That is, the paper examines the specific case of McDonald’s internationalization
to advance a more nuanced view that the much maligned fast food industry, of
which McDonald’s in particular is a symbol, is also a source of benefits to its host
countries.
2.0 Some background
Maurice and Richard McDonald opened their first store in 1940 and their
experiences led them to develop and introduce their innovative Speedee Service
System in 1948 in San Bernardino, California.2 Six years later, Ray Kroc, a
salesman of milkshake mixers, discovered their operation.3 Impressed, he
convinced the brothers to give him a franchise for the Mid-West. Kroc opened
his first store in 1955 in Des Plaines, Illinois, and when he bought the brothers out
in 1961 for US$2.7mn, the chain had 100 stores. By the end of 2006, it had
31,667 stores and consolidated revenues of US$21.6bn.
McDonald’s first opened stores outside the United States in 1967 in
British Columbia and Puerto Rico; at the time it had not yet entered all 50 states.5
In 1970 McDonald’s both opened a store in Alaska, completing its presence in all
50 states, and one in Costa Rica, its first outside North America.
When McDonald’s first went abroad it was often unique to its host
country. First, its US competitors either had not yet gone abroad, or were no
further along in their internationalization. Second, not only was fast food itself
generally a new concept, but in many countries eating meals outside the home
2

For a thorough treatment of much of the history, see Love (1990).
Reputedly, other visitors included James McLamore, who went on to found McDonald’s rival,
Burger King, in Miami in 1957, and Glen Bell, who would found the Taco Bell chain in California
in 1962.
5
Burger King opened a store in Puerto Rico in 1963, beating McDonald’s by some four years.
Burger King followed McDonald’s to Canada in 1969. One can speculate that this sequencing
reflected that fact that McDonald’s headquarters was in Chicago, while Burger King’s was in
Miami.
3
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was uncommon. The uniqueness meant McDonald’s had to overcome a liability
of foreignness, as well as a liability of newness. Not surprisingly, McDonald’s
initially faltered and made mistakes, but it learned from them and expanded.
The number of countries in which McDonald’s operates (including the
US), has followed a classic diffusion-type S-curve (Figure 1).6 The number of
countries has been essentially flat for several years, but the growth in the number
of stores has continued, with the result that at the end of 2006, McDonald’s had
17,272 (56%) of its stores outside the US versus 13,774 (44%) inside the US.
Figure 1
Today, McDonald’s operates in almost 120 countries
140
120
100
Countries
80
60
40
20
0
1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 19911994 1997 2000 2003
Year

Because McDonald’s core competence was a unique process, it generally
preferred a greenfield strategy over acquisitions. (There are some partial
exceptions. When McDonald’s entered Italy in 1985, it grew slowly until in 1996
it acquired Burghy, a local fast-food chain with 80 stores. That acquisition, plus
subsequent expansion, boosted the Italian operation to over 320 stores. In New
Zealand, McDonald’s acquired most of the premises of the failed Georgie’s Pies
chain.) On one or two other occasions, although McDonald’s contemplated
6

The numbers do not fully agree with those McDonald’s publishes. McDonald’s counts England,
Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland separately; this Figure simply treats the first entry, into
England, as entry into the United Kingdom.
3
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acquisitions, it either could not find appropriate targets, or when it did, the targets
would not sell.
As Nachum et al. (2001) point out, for a foreign direct investor to survive
in a host country against local competition, it must either do something differently
than its competitors, or the same thing but better. What McDonald’s and its
American competitors brought was in part specific products such as hamburgers
(McDonald’s, Burger King, and Wendy’s), fried chicken (KFC), donuts (Dunkin
Donuts and Mister Donut), mocha frapuccinos (Starbucks), American pizza
(Dominos and Shakey’s), submarine sandwiches (Subway), and the like. But
more importantly, what they have diffused is the managerial technology of
producing fast food.
There is a time dimension to this internationalization process. Initially the
US firms did something different; those that continue to survive do the same thing
as their domestic competitors, but they do it better. As Steven Den Beste (2002)
once observed:
“That's the critical transition from non-zero-sum to zero-sum. Once the
market saturates, you can only grow at the expense of a competitor.
Which finally leads up to the key insight I had a couple of days ago:
during the non-zero-sum expansion stage, it is the virtues of each
competitor which decide how well they prosper. But after the switch to
zero-sum competition, it is their faults which decide who will die.”
The model here is one of a transition from a suction economic
environment to a pressure economic environment (Kornai 1976). When the US
fast-food chains first entered many countries the chains survived because they
were bringing something new. Initially, outside North America, McDonald’s was
ethnic food—a chance to experience something foreign—consistent with the view
that globalization increases variety within countries, while reducing it across
countries.
Over time, the US chains’ customers assimilated the chains in the sense
that the customers came to include many people who had grown up eating the
chains’ food and no longer thought of them as foreign. (Brailsford (2003) has an
account of this process in New Zealand.) Furthermore, in many countries local
competitors emerged that either adapted the fast-food format to local specialties,
or simply acted as an alternate source of hamburgers and the like; now, the chains
have to survive based on being at least as efficient as their competitors. Although
our focus is on a service company, the underlying logic of the evolution is
Vernon’s (1966) Product Life Cycle theory. Consistent with that theory, some
foreign fast-food companies are now entering the US.
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3.0 Providing training
The Speedee Service System required training, leading McDonald’s to emphasize
this from its earliest days. Furthermore, the QSCV standards (Quality, Service,
Cleanliness, and Value), the glue that binds the essentially policentric company’s
international operations together, depend on training. Trainees learn all 25
positions in a store, from front counter to the grill, on-the-job under the
supervision of crew trainers. What matters here for development is not the skills
themselves, but the introduction of the staff, many of whom work on a part-time
basis and who go on to careers outside McDonald’s, to the basic requirements of
the workaday world and to a modern organization.
Beaulier and Caplan (2007) cite Sowell (1987, p.36) to the effect that, ‘For
young workers especially, the things you can learn on [“menial”] jobs —
responsibility, cooperation, punctuality — can be lifelong assets in many other
occupations. Insulating people from such realities is one of the many cruelties
perpetuated under the banner of “compassion”.’
The parallel is to experience in the military for generations of conscripts
around the world. Although such experience is becoming rarer today (outside
Israel, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, and some other
countries), for millions of men (and in the case of Israel, women too), military
service was a formative experience that provided a mental model of organization.
The concepts the conscripts and junior officers absorbed included hierarchy, line
and staff, manuals and standard operating procedures, attention to detail, neatness
and cleanliness standards, and the like. These are also the concepts to which
McDonald’s exposes its trainees.
As an aside, it is worth noting that employment standards at franchise
stores may be better than those at equivalent independent operators on other
grounds. Cappelli and Hamori (2007) found for a U.S. sample that once they
controlled for industry size and some other issues, franchise operations appeared
on important dimensions to offer better jobs with more sophisticated systems of
employee management than similar non-franchise operations.
In addition to on site training of staff, McDonald’s maintains a system of
formal schools. All managers and franchisees receive business management and
store operations training in centers or one of McDonald’s Hamburger
Universities. McDonald’s opened its first Hamburger University in 1961 in
Oakbrook, Illinois, and the seventh in Hong Kong in 2002. The company also
offers mid-management and executive development courses.
McDonald’s exercises both selection and development with respect to its
franchisees. From among the applicants, McDonald’s picks as prospective
franchisees individuals who have had significant successful experience with
owning or managing multiple business units or multiple departments. It then

5
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requires the prospective franchisees to undergo training in business operations.
The aspirants first work in a McDonald’s store for 9-18 months, complete a
number of self-directed, part-time (20 hours per week) training modules,
participate in seminars, conferences, one-on-one training sessions, and operator
training classes, and complete two advanced five-day courses at a Hamburger
University. Only then may they become owners. Managers who are not
franchisees too undergo a similar combination of on-the-job and formal training.
Before it opened in Bolivia, McDonald’s required the two local individuals who
would be the managing directors of the joint-venture to attend the Oakbrook
Hamburger University. Subsequently, the rest of the management team
underwent training in McDonald’s stores in Uruguay (Anon. 1997).
We know, because McDonald’s is proud of the statistic, that over 70% of
its executives started in its stores. What we would like to know, but do not, is
how many managers of other companies, especially in developing and emerging
economies, received their first management training in McDonald’s, or other
foreign fast-food chains.
To facilitate the flow of ideas laterally, McDonald’s make use of traveling
executives (Brandt 1991) and cross-border meetings. In 1991, McDonald’s
employed five traveling personnel directors who spent as much as 100 days a year
abroad. These individuals operated as consultants, keeping local directors
informed about what their counterparts in other countries were doing in the
personnel area, and helped solve specific, local human resource problems.
McDonald’s organizes cross-border meetings by either regions (e.g., a
European store managers meeting), or functional areas (e.g., purchasing,
construction, or accounting). Now the store managers have started to meet
globally. In 2004, Guy Russo, CEO of McDonald’s Australia, convened the first
ever Global Restaurant Managers convention, to “…create an opportunity for
restaurant managers across the globe to come together to share ideas, engage in
new experiences and make great friends.” Some 3500 store managers from
McDonald’s stores worldwide converged on Sydney, Australia, to see an
exhibition featuring 80 suppliers from all over the world.
4.0 Promoting entrepreneurship
McDonald’s has promoted the development of entrepreneurship in host
economies both directly through its joint-venture and franchise operations, and
indirectly in inspiring competition. All this is in addition to any effect it has had
on its suppliers (see below).
In Asia, McDonald’s has used joint-ventures with local partners with good
contacts and local knowledge; local law permitting, McDonald’s will take a
majority share. In Bolivia McDonald’s used a joint-venture, with McDonald’s
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and the local partners each providing 50 percent of the US$6mn necessary to
construct the first four stores (Anon. 1997).
In riskier foreign markets, McDonald’s simply licenses its name, while
retaining an option to acquire. In choosing its licensees McDonald’s looks for
individuals with good local standing. In Saudi Arabia, the licensee for the Eastern
Region is a member of the Saudi royal family; in the Western and Central Region,
the licensee is member of one of the richest merchant families in the Kingdom.
Because McDonald’s favors engaged entrepreneurs as owners, it generally avoids
investor groups or passive investors. Licensees, like franchisees, must adhere to
the QSCV standards.
Franchisees are the key to McDonald’s operation. Of its 31,667 stores
(2006; includes 621 stores belonging to the Boston Market chain), McDonald’s
only owns and operates 8,785 (28%); franchisees own and operate 18,687 (59%),
and affiliated companies own and operate 4,195 (13%). Of total system-wide
sales of US$57.5bn, company-owned stores produced US$16.bn (28%), whereas
franchisee and affiliated stores produced US$41.4bn (72%). The company
expects its franchises not only to meet the QSCV standards, but to have a
commitment to McDonald’s—“to have ketchup in their veins”.
To qualify for a franchise a prospective owner must make a substantial
down payment that must come from non-borrowed personal resources, exclusive
of the owner’s home. This requirement is both a screening device and a bond.
The down payment may signal past success, and because franchisees are betting
their own money—if they fail, they lose their investment—the willingness to risk
the payment signals self-confidence.
Furthermore, because franchisees would lose their down payment if they
lose their license due to a failure to maintain the QSVC standards, they have an
incentive to maintain those standards. Over time, as Kaufman and Lafontaine
(1994) show, McDonald’s “leaves money on the table” in that the franchise or
license agreements permit the recipient to retain some of the economic rents from
the venture, rents that grow as the venture grows. Revoking a license may be
difficult and take time, but McDonald’s has done so in Paris (1977-1982) and El
Salvador (1996-8).
Lastly, McDonald’s has a tradition of bottom-up innovation. As owners,
the franchisees have an incentive to innovate to improve their profitability; menu
innovations franchisees have introduced include the Big Mac, Fillet-o-Fish, and
Egg McMuffin. Similarly, franchisees and affiliates have introduced operating
innovations such as improved meat freezers (Sweden), pre-fabricated modular
stores (The Netherlands), and mini, satellite stores (Singapore).
This
phenomenon demonstrates Knott’s (2000) argument for the dynamic value of
hierarchy. McDonald’s management selects among the innovations and promotes
the diffusion throughout the system of those that it thinks will benefit the

7
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company. McDonald’s ability to appropriate the ideas may forestall some
innovation, but provides it some recompense for letting franchisees and licensees
retain a share of the economic rents accruing to their being part of McDonald’s.
McDonald’s has also spurred entrepreneurship indirectly by inspiring
competitors. It has come to face local competitors in the hamburger market, and
competition from entrepreneurs who have applied the fast food approach to
indigenous or other cuisines. In several cases when the local entrepreneur created
their chain before McDonald’s arrived, the local firm has been able to retain the
lead. This has occurred in developed and developing countries.
In Belgium, the market leader is the Quick hamburger chain, with 75
stores. Quick opened its first store in Belgium in 1971, after GIB, then Belgium’s
largest retailer, sent a management team to the U.S. to study and copy
McDonald's.7 McDonald's didn't arrive in Belgium until 1978 and now has 57
stores there. (Quick also has nine stores in Algeria, Dubai, Morocco, and
Réunion; McDonalds has 49 stores in Dubai, 18 in Morocco, and six in Réunion.)
In Peru McDonald’s ten stores compete with Bembos’ 30 stores, the
differential in part a result of Bembos having opened in 1988, while McDonald’s
only entered in 1996. Furthermore, Bembos reports that it rejected McDonald’s
expression of interest in buying it. Wanting to expand internationally, Bembos
considered entering Bolivia and Chile (Garcia et al., 2004), but in 2005 opened in
Mexico. This initiative may have failed, but more recently Bembos has
apparently opened stores in Mumbai and Panamá City, Panamá.
In the Philippines, Jollibee, which was established in 1973 as an ice-cream
parlor and did not add fast-food until 1979, had only 11 stores by 1981 when
McDonald’s arrived. It now has 583 stores in the Philippines to McDonald’s 250.
Jollibee has expanded abroad; it operates a store each in Guam and Saipan, eleven
in California, one in Nevada, and a handful spread over Hong Kong, Vietnam,
and Brunei.8 Jollibee’s core products are fried chicken, spaghetti, and hamburgers
with a Pilipino flavor. McDonald’s Philippines has had to introduce its
McSpaghetti to match Jollibee’s offerings.
As the Bembos and Jollibee cases show, often the local entrepreneurs have
chosen not to tackle McDonald’s head on, but rather to feature local tastes or
other foods, copying the idea, but not the menu. In Canada, especially Quebec,
McDonald’s faces, among others, the Chez Ashton chain, which has built itself
around poutine. Poutine, which originated in Quebec, is a locally popular
combination of French fries, cheese curd, and gravy, augmented with such items
7

In 2000 GIB sold Quick to the French retailer, Carrefour, the second largest retailer in the world
after Walmart.
8
However, it failed in Bahrain, Indonesia Kuwait, Papua New Guinea, Sarawak, Singapore, Saudi
Arabia, and the UAE. Relative to McDonald’s it faced difficulties in attracting good local
partners, getting prime locations, and in appealing to non-Filipinos.
DOI: 10.2202/1524-5861.1327
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as boiled peas, or pieces of sausage, hamburger, chicken, and the like. Chez
Ashton began in 1969, but did not introduce poutine until 1972. McDonald’s
arrived in 1972 and now has over 280 stores versus Chez Ashton’s 25; it too now
offers poutine, in addition to its normal menu.
McDonald’s largely dominates the French fast-food sector where it dwarfs
Belgium’s Quick chain and France’s Elior group. Quick, which bought the
O’Kitch chain in 1986 and Burger King’s French stores in 1997, is the number
two fast-food chain with 317 stores (McDonald’s has 1085).9 Still, competition,
and criticism, led McDonald’s recently to overhaul its entire French operation by
upgrading the décor, introducing new items, using more organic ingredients,
providing nutritional labeling, and opening its stores to scrutiny.10
In Brazil, McDonald’s competes with a number of local fast-food chains,
including Habib’s and Mister Sheik, two chains specializing in Middle Eastern
cuisine. Habib’s’ Portugal-born founder saw an opportunity in offering Arabic
fast-food (Plummer 2005). The menu includes hummus, esfihas, kibe, and the
like, but also pizzas and burgers. Habib’s has some 285 stores in Brazil,
compared to McDonald’s 542 stores, 549 kiosks, and 49 McCafés, but shelved its
plan to open in Florida after the Islamist terrorist attack on the US on September
11, 2001. Instead Habib’s opened six stores in Mexico.
McDonald's opened its first mainland Chinese store in Shenzhen in 1990
and has some 670 outlets in some 70 cities. Now dozens of local competitors
have established operations that offer fare ranging from Chinese-style beef
noodles to soy milk.
This far from exhaustive list simply illustrates the point that in many
countries where McDonald’s now operates, and even in some where it does not,
local entrepreneurs have sought to apply the McDonald’s model, with
modifications. (McDonald’s does not operate in Kyrgyzstan; however, there are a
number of individual entrepreneurs and chains, including one calling itself Mac
Burger, which offer a split bun filled with shavings from a rotating wheel of some
sort of grilled meat, augmented with slaw, mayonnaise, cucumber, tomato, and
mini French fries, all lathered with ketchup.) The key point is that McDonald’s
inspired imitators, some of whom are now challenging it in third markets, and
even in the US. The diffusion of both the hamburger and the fast-food production
process thus has provided opportunities for local entrepreneurs.
9

The O’Kitch chain belonged to the McDonald’s franchisee in Paris who lost his license in 1982
for failure to maintain the QSCV standards. After he lost the license he changed the name on his
stores and continued to operate.
10
The move appears to have been successful, resulting in rapid growth in sales. Denis Hennequin,
the Frenchman who was CEO of McDonald’s in France and introduced the changes, is now CEO
of McDonald’s Europe, overseeing some 41 countries. He has introduced the McPassport, which
appeals to young employees’ desire to travel because it allows them to transfer to any McDonald’s
store within the European Union.
9
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Hunter and Ryan (2005) report that in Poland, transition has brought with
it a remarkable growth of small and medium businesses, including the
development of about 100 international and domestically created franchise
businesses that employ over half a million Poles. Among the foreign franchise
chains they list some nine fast food chains, including McDonald’s and its major
competitors.
5.0 Backward linkages
McDonald’s is not vertically integrated. Instead, it seeks out local suppliers, or
works with independent suppliers with whom it has been able to establish an
alliance. This strategy frees McDonald’s to concentrate on retailing, reduces
transportation costs and exchange rate risk, and builds local political support.
Ray Kroc realized that the chain’s success lay in its process, and that he
could eschew vertical integration; consequently, he sought out small, hungry
companies as suppliers, doing business on a handshake. Today, many suppliers
have an open-book relationship in which McDonald’s sets their profits. Although
McDonald’s is often a monopsonist, with the supplier having no contract,
McDonald’s prizes relationships with the firms that can meet its demanding
quality and service standards. It doesn’t shop around for the lowest price and the
supplier may equally end up as a monopolist vis-à-vis McDonald’s.
For instance, when McDonald’s entered Mexico in 1985, McDonald’s
buyer visited Bimbo Bakeries, a local company, but Bimbo’s buns failed a taste
test (Millman 2000). A shocked Bimbo’s chairman decided to invest US$30
million in a successful bit to bring his products up to McDonald’s standards.
Bimbo first became a preferred supplier for bread products for McDonald’s in
Mexico, and then its exclusive supplier. Since 1999, Bimbo has qualified to
provide all the bread products for McDonald’s in Peru and Venezuela, and in
Colombia where it has a joint-venture with a local firm.
Another example comes from Bolivia. When McDonald’s entered in
1997, it contracted with Frigosa for hamburger meat, La Francesa for buns, and
Hipermaxi for iceberg lettuce, but required them to upgrade their technology and
know-how (Anon. 1997).
In Russia, however, McDonald’s had to set up its own supply operation.
In 1986 McDonald’s Canada and the City of Moscow established a joint-venture
in which the City took a 51% share in return for providing the site; McDonald’s
Canada took a 49% share, but received complete management authority.11 Part of
the five years of preparation that preceded the opening of the first store in 1990
involved McDonald’s building its “McComplex” production center outside the
11

McDonald’s now wholly-owns its Russian operation.
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city. The production center still operates but McDonald’s now also has local
Russian suppliers.
In Brazil, McDonald’s established Food City in 1999, which is a facility
that unites several of its suppliers in one location. The suppliers are Braslo, which
provides hamburgers and chicken, Interbakers, which provides bread products,
and Martin-Brower, which manages the complex and provides the logistics to get
the food to McDonald’s stores.
6.0 Promoting exports
After McDonald’s certifies products for use in its local stores, it works with the
manufacturers to enable them to supply McDonald’s stores in neighboring
countries as well. Being an ally of McDonald’s in several markets strengthens the
alliance for both the local firm and McDonald’s. Furthermore, by facilitating
exports, McDonald’s reduces host-government concerns about the Balance of
Payments effects of its imports of those products it cannot source locally.
Incidentally, the McComplex in Russia now exports to almost 20 other countries,
including Germany and Austria.
There are many cases of McDonald’s providing an export market to its
suppliers. The Colombian firm that provides uniforms to McDonald’s in
Colombia also provides them in Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. The Colombian
supplier of cups and lids also exports to other McDonald’s elsewhere.
McDonald’s largest international supplier of French fries is McCain
Foods, a privately-owned firm based in New Brunswick, Canada. McCain is the
world's largest maker of French fries and includes McDonald’s competitors such
as KFC among its customers. McCain has more than 55 plants (producing a
variety of foods, not just potato-based ones) in 18 countries and sells to over 100
countries.
The Moscow McComplex depended on McCain’s extensive
involvement in order to produce the requisite McDonald’s fries. When McCain
opened its first plant in Latin America in 1996, in Argentina, it did so to supply
McDonald’s in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay.
In 1971, McDonald’s entered Australia and turned to FJ Walker Foods, a
local company, for its beef. Today, FJ Walker and Australian Food Corporation
export beef patties to Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Kuwait, Morocco, and
Saudi Arabia, and provide a McDonald’s world reference beef patty; their patties
provide the standard for measuring the quality of beef patties made in other
McDonald’s around the world.
In effect, McDonald’s forces its suppliers to meet world standards; selling
to McDonald’s is the equivalent of exporting. As the examples show, having met
world standards, McDonald’s suppliers are able to export not only to
McDonald’s, but also in their own name to a variety of foreign markets.

11

Brought to you by | University of Pennsylvania
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/7/16 5:05 PM

Global Economy Journal, Vol. 7 [2007], Iss. 4, Art. 5

7.0 Generating positive externalities
A recent report on a series of McKinsey case studies that included the food
retailing sector in Mexico and Brazil, suggests that FDI generates positive
externalities (Farrell et al., 2004). In the sectors studied, FDI raised productivity
and output levels, while it lowered prices and improved the quality and selection
of products and services for consumers. Furthermore, the authors found that in
every instance the foreign companies paid employees wages that were equal to or
greater than those that domestic competitors paid.
Smarzynnska Javorcik et al., (2006) studied the effect of Wal-Mart on the
Mexican soap, detergent and surfactants (SDS) industry. They found that
Walmex (Walmart’s Mexican operation), fundamentally changed the retail sector
by forcing suppliers to cut their profit margins or innovate. Those unable to meet
the standards lost market share and in some cases disappeared; at the same time
the industry exhibited impressive efficiency gains.
But FDI can bring other, perhaps subtler externalities. McDonald’s
emphasis on cleanliness, including or especially in restrooms, has led its
competitors to upgrade their facilities. Before the first McDonald’s opened up in
1975, restrooms in Hong Kong’s restaurants were notoriously dirty (Watson
1997). Over time, competitors felt compelled to meet McDonald’s cleanliness
standards. The same thing appears to be occurring in China (Watson 2000). In
Korea, McDonald’s introduced the practice of lining up in an orderly fashion to
order food; traditional practice was simply to crowd the counter, with success in
ordering accruing to the most aggressive (Watson 2000). In the Philippines,
Jollibee mimics McDonald's clean and well-lighted look.
A third area where the presence of McDonald’s may raise standards is in
animal welfare. Grandin and Johnson (2005), in a fascinating and strange book
(Grandin is autistic and has a PhD in Animal Science), explain the criteria and
audit forms for humane slaughter and handling that Dr. Grandin developed for the
American Meat Institute. In 1999, McDonald’s hired Dr. Grandin to implement
her audit criteria and train their auditors. McDonald’s initially implemented the
audits for its suppliers in the US and since then has extended them to its suppliers
elsewhere. McDonald’s reports that in 2004, its auditors completed nearly 540
audits to cover the majority of the facilities that provide it with its meat products
in all the major geographic sectors in which it operates. Because Dr. Grandin’s
approach changes how the suppliers operate their plants, any improvements in the
treatment of animals intended for McDonald’s apply to all animals the plants
process. At the same time, McDonald’s recognizes that local business units may
develop additional standards and compliance systems as appropriate to local legal,
supply chain, and cultural conditions. For instance, depending on the country, or
even the store, slaughtering may have to conform to religious requirements such
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as the halal and kashrut (kosher) rules. More generally, in 2005 the Royal
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals in the UK praised McDonald’s
for its cattle handling standards and gave the company an award because it had
shifted its egg suppliers to those that produced only free-range eggs.
8.0 Limitations of the argument
McDonald’s only goes to countries where it is confident that it can maintain its
QSCV standards. This eliminates many countries where it can neither find nor
introduce the supplies it needs, or operate safely.
In 1999 Thomas Friedman wrote, “No two countries that have McDonald's
have ever fought a war since each got McDonald's,” which was really an
argument about the salutary effects of trade and integration. However, what the
observation suggests is that McDonald’s tends to enter countries that are
integrated into the world economy and that can provide some level of political
stability. Political stability does not always last—McDonald’s had to withdraw
from Nicaragua for some years—and Friedman’s observation is not infallible.12
Still, in general, the observation holds.
In Nicaragua during the Sandinista regime (1979-1990) and civil war
(1981-1989), the licensee was unable to maintain McDonald’s standards so in
1980 asked the company to suspend his license. He continued to operate under
the name “Donald’s” until McDonald’s return in 1998. (Offered the license, he
transferred it to his daughter, who had gone to work for McDonald’s in Spain.)
Two correlates of McDonald’s presence are per capita GDP and the rule of
law. We use as a proxy for the rule of law Transparency International’s (TI)
Corruption Perception Index (CPI); of the 132 countries that TI rated in 2003, the
least corrupt country was Finland, with a score of 9.7 (10 is maximum); the most
corrupt was Bangladesh, with a score of 1.3. (The US score was 7.5.)
If we regress a (1,0) dummy variable for the presence of McDonald’s (1 =
present) on TI’s index, the total urban population, per capita GDP, and urban
GDP (urban population times per capita GDP), we get the following results (with
t-statistics in parentheses):
Prob(Presence = 1) = 0.23 + 0.085 TICPI +0.0019 Urban population
(2.06) (2.47)
(2.53)
+ 0.0033 per capita GDP - 0.0000 Urban GDP
(0.50)
(-0.73)
R2 = 0.26
SER = 0.42 n = 121

12

The exceptions include the 1989 United States invasion of Panamá, the 1999 NATO (US)
bombing of Serbia, and arguably, the 2006 Lebanon War.
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The standardized coefficients are 0.42 and 0.09 for the TICPI and per
capita GDP; clearly, the rule of law provides a much better explanation for
McDonald’s presence than income levels, though of course the two are correlated
(0.88). With a standardized coefficient of 0.23, the size of the urban population is
also an important variable; per capita GDP and total urban GDP (whose
standardized coefficient is -0.07), are not.
In terms of predictions, the model generates 11 false positives, many of
which are in Africa, and a number of which one can readily explain by
idiosyncratic factors, such as, for example, the absence of McDonald’s from Iran,
Gaza and the West Bank, and Syria. One false positive is Trinidad and Tobago,
which McDonald’s entered in 1994 but left in 2003. The model also generates 11
false negatives; several of these are Central American states such as Guatemala,
Honduras, and Nicaragua, and Transition Economies such as Azerbaijan, Georgia,
and the Ukraine. Many of the false negatives may simply represent the
availability of an entrepreneur willing to pull McDonald’s in before it seeks to
push itself forward. The examples of McDonald’s success in unlikely venues
around the world, particularly France and Japan, and its few failures—it is in
about 120 countries, has withdrawn from six, half of which it has returned to—
suggests that some of these entrepreneurs may well be prescient.13
9.0 Conclusion
McDonald’s does not lack criticism. However, examination of its international
operations raises the possibility that perhaps it deserves some plaudits too,
suggesting the appropriateness of a more nuanced assessment. The anecdotal
evidence suggests that various aspects of its presence in host countries deserve
further investigation. It would be worthwhile for researchers to establish the scale
of the benefits that McDonald’s and its fast food brethren bring in the areas of
providing management training, encouraging entrepreneurship, developing local
suppliers, promoting exports, and improving productivity, standards of service,
and animal welfare.
However, the little statistical exercise in the previous sections suggests
two caveats. First, cross-national studies are not likely to be useful in testing the
argument and establishing the scale of the benefits; intra-country case studies and
surveys are more likely to prove fruitful. Secondly, the results suggest the
existence of a virtuous circle: countries that succeed in institutionalizing some
rule of law and that are open to the world will be recipients of McDonald’s
presence and the attendant benefits. Countries that cannot meet these criteria will
be left behind.
13

The three from which it withdrew and has not yet returned are arguably Bermuda (1997-2002),
and Bolivia (1997-2002) and Trinidad and Tobago (1994-2003).
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